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ABSTRACT
In the United States, public schools are primarily financed by local tax on property. This
property-tax-based system of finance is advantageous for people living in wealthy
districts, as they benefit from greater educational funding resources. Residents of poorer
districts, however, have the disadvantage of higher taxation that is needed to balance the
deficit created by the lower value of property in these areas in order to finance local
services. Through the use of local exclusionary planning and zoning powers, local
governments can ensure that residents contribute a minimum amount of taxation to fund
local services and to zone out “expensive students” who need more funds than their
wealthier peers while their families contribute less to the local tax pool. In a society with
a history of racial discrimination, this system has led to the creation of structural
segregation in education that follows a pattern of residential segregation. Society’s
adoption of equal opportunity rhetoric since the successful challenge of legal segregation
in Brown has masked this reality and made it more difficult for depressed minorities to
explain their condition. The injustice is produced by the interplay between historical
subordination and a vague suspicion that equality has been achieved when formal barriers
were removed. The potential for change was both created and limited by engaging the
rights discourse because the emphasis on formalism and colorblindness since Brown has
rendered the achievement of formal equality an end in itself. This makes it very difficult
to redress the lasting material disadvantage that resulted from a discriminatory past
because the dominant theory of equal protection that is infused with an “antidifferentiation” understanding of the law often rules out remedial policies that use racebased classifications.
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I. Introduction
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms. 1
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. […] Education, of course, is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. 2
[T]he majority’s holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic
commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable
acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years of the
chance to reach their full potential as citizens. 3
The United States has a long history of racial segregation that formally ended in 1954
with the Supreme Court’s promise in Brown v. Board of Education4 to make education
available to all on equal terms. Racial segregation was, however, not restricted to public
education, and Brown’s message that separate is inherently unequal was soon accepted as
precedent beyond the education context to prohibit state-sanctioned racial discrimination
in the entire public domain. Apart from education, segregation was most pervasive in the
housing sector. For many years, the official policy of the federal government was to
promote homeownership and single-family residence in place of low-income housing
projects. By creating incentives for middle-class families to abandon the city for the
suburbs, the government-sponsored housing program accelerated the decline of inner city
1
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 – 71, J. Marshall dissenting opinion.
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neighborhoods and forever altered the character of housing in the United States. The
economic exclusion of racial minorities in the United States today coupled with the
tradition of local school finance have ultimately led to the “re-segregation” of public
schools that began when white and wealthy families abandoned the cities for the suburbs,
causing the poor inner-city schools to deteriorate further.
This paper examines the legal system that allowed for economic exclusion to
replicate previous racial exclusion and ultimately produced a problem of structural
segregation in the American public education system. This problem is certainly more
complex and multi-layered than government-mandated segregation of housing and public
education. Whereas it was racism that was the driving force behind social change
activism in the 1950s and 1960s, racism alone will not do as an explanation for the
current plight of racial minorities that find themselves in a situation of economic
exclusion. At the same time, the problem cannot be explained only in terms of economic
exclusion and lack of access to public education due to disparities in income, because
there is an evident racial dimension to the problem that cannot be ignored. The point is
that just because the problems with public education in the post-Brown era cannot be
solely attributed to race does not mean that race is irrelevant. It seems, however, that
society’s adoption of the rhetoric of equal opportunity law since the successful challenge
of segregation in Brown has masked this reality and made it more difficult for depressed
minorities to explain their condition.
Education jurisprudence after Brown will be analyzed in the paper in order to
show how the potential for change was both created and limited by engaging the rights
discourse to challenge unequal education. Since Brown, courts have adopted an approach
to equal protection analysis that prioritizes colorblindness and race-neutrality over
redressing the lasting effects of a history of racial subordination. Formal equality has been
seen as an end in itself which made it more difficult to achieve a real break with the
discriminatory past. Racial subordination lingers and takes on different forms after the
repeal of segregation laws. The equal protection doctrine under the dominant antidifferentiation approach and its emphasis on colorblindness fails to redress this
subordination because it cannot recognize it. The failure of equal protection to remedy
current inequities between whites and racial minorities is evidenced by the fact that, as
2

will be shown, litigants in education reform cases have shifted their focus from equality
to adequacy as the goal after the repeated failure of equal protection challenges in the
aftermath of Brown.
In this sense, this research is essentially an inquiry into the relationship between
law and equality and how a legal equality framework can be biased against groups with a
history of racial subordination. Its objective is to ultimately show that Brown has failed as
a framework for social change through the courts. It will be argued that racial minorities
need a post-Brown strategy that is grounded in their particular reality because the
insensitiveness of the present equal protection doctrine to the history of racial
subordination coupled with its emphasis on colorblindness obstructs progress and stands
in the way towards a more equal world.
II. The History of Public Education in the United States
A. Legal Segregation
Free public education is firmly rooted in the history of the United States. The concept was
introduced in American society as early as 1643 when the State of Virginia instituted a
system of compulsory apprenticeship for certain groups including orphans, poor children
and children born out of wedlock. 5 By the middle of the nineteenth century, schooling in
the United States had reached exceptionally high levels, among free Americans, and
literacy was virtually universal, once again among the free population. 6By contrast, slaves
were categorically excluded from formal school instruction until 1865 when slavery was
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, while free blacks attended –
if at all – segregated schools which typically suffered from the lack of funds, trained
teachers and equipment.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution improved the legal rights of
blacks, in particular the freed slaves, by granting them the “equal protection of the law.”
In spite of the Fourteenth Amendment, many states throughout the South enacted so5

U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the right to education: Mission to the United States of America, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/60/Add.1
(January 17, 2002) (prepared by Katarina Tomašesvski).
6
Claudia Goldin, A Brief History of Education in the United State 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Historical Paper No. 119, 1999).
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called “Jim Crow laws” that mandated segregation of whites and racial minorities in all
public facilities. In 1892, one such “Jim Crow law” was challenged in court for the first
time. In a train of the East Louisiana Railroad, a passenger, Homer Plessy, who was
classified as “Black” according to Louisiana law refused to leave the car for whites which
ultimately lead to his arrest. Plessy challenged the arrest in court, arguing that that the
legal separation of blacks from whites on trains violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1896, his case was heard by the United States Supreme
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson 7. By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court ruled against Plessy. In
establishing the “separate but equal” doctrine for which it is famous, Plessy distinguished
between social and political rights of citizenship:
The object of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. 8
Plessy established a framework which was used to justify a system of complex
laws and regulations that assigned blacks an inferior position vis-à-vis their white peers
not only in education, but in all walks of social life from public accommodation to water
fountains and swimming pools. The “separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy
dominated the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee
for more than half a century. However, in 1954, the United States Supreme Court
overturned this doctrine in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education by
ultimately striking down the system of segregated public schooling. In Brown, the
Supreme Court consolidated five separate cases involving black children whose
admission to public schools attended by white children was denied on the basis of their
race. The Court held that the “segregation of white and Negro children in the public
schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or
requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws
7

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 9Furthermore, the Warren Court declared that
education is “the most important function of state and local governments,” 10 and found
that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” 11 The Court argued that
separating children from others solely on the basis of their race “generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.” 12
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown transcended racial segregation, as it led to
the implementation of equal opportunity in a wide range of educational policy areas,
including school disciplinary practices and bilingual education. 13Brown was also accepted
as precedent beyond the education context to prohibit government-sanctioned racial
discrimination in every other area of public life. 14 It provided the foundation for
challenging unconstitutional practices in other social policy areas and extending
egalitarian principles to other historically marginalized groups, such as women, the
elderly and the disabled. 15 As desegregation and issues relating to equal educational
opportunity became part of the courts’ agenda, integrative remedies to overcome inequity
were ordered by the courts on a number of occasions to implement the Brown mandate.
Congress supported the courts’ efforts to secure a meaningful educational opportunity to
the victims of school segregation by enacting the first major education aid act (Title I of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965) and passing Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act that empowered the government to cut federal funding to any school
district that was involved in discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin. 16
B. Structural Segregation
Apart from public education, segregation was most pervasive in the housing sector.
According to Kenneth Jackson, “[n]o agency of the United States government has had a
more pervasive and powerful impact on the American people over the past half-century
9

Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
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Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the
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14
Id.
15
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than the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).” 17 In fact, segregation in housing was
for many years an official policy of the federal government entrusted to the FHA which
was created as part of the National Housing Act in 1934. Perhaps it is important here to
dedicate a few paragraphs to explaining the role of the FHA in housing segregation in
order to provide a fuller picture of how segregation in housing in the first half of the
twentieth century helped transform de jure segregation into a problem of structural
segregation in the education system that follows a pattern of residential segregation.
The FHA did not build houses, but it insured long-term mortgage loans that were
made by private lenders to construct and sell homes against loss, “with the full weight of
the United States Treasury behind the contract.” 18 FHA-secured loans benefited the
construction industry as well as potential homebuyers in many different ways with the
result that the number of American families who could realistically consider the option of
becoming homeowners increased substantially, as it oftentimes was cheaper to buy than
to rent houses. First, as opposed to the time before the FHA began its operation when first
mortgages were limited to one-half or two-thirds of the value of the property, a lender
whose mortgage loan was insured by the FHA was able to grant credit that amounts to
about 93 percent of the collateral. 19 This meant that the down payments mortgagors had
to make did not exceed ten percent. Second, the repayment period of FHA-secured loans
was extended to twenty five to thirty years. 20 Furthermore, because the risk to financial
institutions if a loan was not repaid by the mortgagor was almost nonexistent, interest
rates fell by two or three percentage points compared to the 1920s. 21 These changes
together with the minimum standards for home construction that were established by the
FHA revolutionized the construction industry and fundamentally altered production and
consumption behavior in the housing market. Jackson goes even further: “the middleclass suburban family with the new house and long-term, fixed-rate, FHA-insured
mortgage became a symbol, and perhaps a stereotype, of the American way of life.” 22
17

KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) in
GERALD E. FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD AND DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4TH ED.) 317 (2006).
18
Jackson, supra note 17.
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Id. at 317 – 318.
20
Id. at 318.
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Id.
22
Id.
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The obvious flipside of FHA programs was that they accelerated the decline of
inner city neighborhoods by creating incentives for middle-class families to abandon the
city for the suburbs. Absent an official anti-urban bias, the programs caused the financing
stream to flow in the direction of single-family projects to the detriment of multi-family
projects. Suburban favoritism was also the result of the “unbiased professional estimate”
that was required by the FHA as a prerequisite to any loan guarantee. 23 This mandatory
procedure included an evaluation of the property, the borrower and the neighborhood
with the objective of guaranteeing that the value of the insured property would always
exceed the amount of outstanding debt during the term of the mortgage. 24 Neighborhood
appraisals, the most influential of these ratings in determining “safe locations” for
insuring mortgages, had a lasting impact on the character of housing in the United States.
Of the eight criteria established by the FHA for evaluating the desirability of residential
areas for purposes of loan guarantees, “relative economic stability” and “protection from
adverse influences” together accounted for sixty percent of the neighborhood
evaluation. 25 According to Jackson, the interpretation of both was influenced by personal
and agency bias in favor of all-white subdivisions and thus translated into clear prejudice
against heterogeneous environments. 26 The FHA was concerned with racial disharmony
in housing, as it feared that failure to maintain rigid white-black separation would close
entire residential areas to financing. 27 For this reason, it openly recommended regulations
and restrictive covenants as a way of prohibiting black occupancy until the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Shelley v. Kramer 28 that these covenants were unenforceable and
contrary to public policy.
By re-packaging racist tradition and discriminatory market attitudes against lowincome housing as public policy, the FHA furthered the racial and economic segregation
of suburbia and its actions radically altered the character of housing in the United States.
However, the lasting damage done by the policies of the FHA is not confined to the
housing market. It makes itself felt in the public services sector as well, primarily
23

Id.
Id.
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education. Despite the shift in public discourse about racism brought about by the civil
rights movement, racial and economic segregation still persists in America’s cities and
schools. The economic exclusion of racial minorities in the U.S. today coupled with the
tradition of local education finance have led to the “re-segregation” of public schools that
began when white and wealthy families abandoned the cities for the suburbs causing the
poor inner-city schools to deteriorate further.
The system that allowed for economic exclusion to replicate previous racial
exclusion can be explained as follows. In the United States, public schools are primarily
financed by a local tax on property. Only about seven percent of a school district’s
funding comes from the federal government.29 Schools do not get the majority of their
revenues even from the states, as the ultimate decision about school finance is made by
school districts. 30 This property-tax-based system of finance is advantageous for people
living in wealthy districts, as they benefit from greater educational funding resources. By
contrast, residents of poorer districts have the disadvantage of higher taxation that is
needed to balance the deficit created by the lower value of property in these areas in order
to finance local services. Of course, common sense would lead poorer families to
contemplate purchasing smaller residential units in wealthy districts to benefit from the
lower tax burdens and the quality services offered by the locality including public
education. This option is, however, foreclosed by the use of local exclusionary planning
and zoning powers which is an organizing principle in American local government law.
To prevent poor families from “infiltrating” the locality, local governments can set a
minimum lot size for property within their boundaries to ensure that residents contribute a
minimum amount of taxation to fund local services and to zone out “expensive students”
who need more funds than their wealthier peers while their families contribute less to the
local tax pool.
The interplay between racial and economic factors in the production of structural
segregation is explained by Richard Ford’s economic model of a society which consists
of only two groups, blacks and whites, where blacks, due to historical discrimination,

29

Deric Wu, Can International Human Rights Law Change the State of Minority Education in the United
States?, 8 RUTGERS RACE AND L. REV. 139, 141 (2006).
30
Goldin, supra note 6, at 2.
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tend to earn less than whites. 31 Ford’s model assumes that this society has enacted a
program of reform that has eliminated the legal sanction of racial discrimination, and has
succeeded in eliminating racism altogether through a program of public education. 32 This
hypothetical society also consists of geographically defined governments with extensive
powers to levy local taxes and use the revenues to fund local services including public
education. 33 Before the program of racial reform was enacted, this society was strictly
segregated along racial lines, such that it consisted of entirely white and entirely black
enclaves. 34 Against this background, it could be imagined that the elimination of de jure
discrimination and racial prejudice would eventually lead to racial desegregation.
According to Ford, however, even in the absence of racism, white neighborhoods would
be eager to maintain their “whiteness” for purely economic reasons as long as substantial
income differences between whites and blacks persist.35 Whites would be reluctant to
leave their white neighborhoods and move into poorer black neighborhoods with higher
tax burdens and a lower quality of local services. As a result, racial segregation will be
transformed into economic segregation. 36 “Thus, even in the absence of racism, raceneutral policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic
stratification in a society with a history of racism. […] Spatially and racially defined
communities perform the ‘work’ of segregation silently.” 37 The potency of this dynamic
will, of course, become more apparent if we introduce real-life complications into this
model, such as racial fear, local zoning powers, redlining and the preference of private
developers to build affordable housing in white jurisdictions. 38
Ford describes the problem with the present-day political geography of America
as a problem of economic exclusion with a racial profile. This problem is certainly more
complex and nuanced than government-mandated segregation of housing and public
education. Whereas it was racism that was the driving force behind social change actions
in the 1950s and 1960s, racism alone will not do as an explanation for the current plight
31

Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L.
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32
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of racial minorities that find themselves in a situation of economic exclusion. At the same
time, the problem cannot be explained only in terms of economic exclusion and lack of
access to public education due to disparities in income, because there is an evident racial
dimension to the problem that cannot be ignored. The point is that just because the
problems with public education in the post-Brown era cannot be solely attributed to race
does not mean that race is irrelevant. As Ruth Gordon points out, race is a fluctuating and
contingent concept because its meaning is constantly re-shaped as a result of social
struggle. 39It seems, however, that society’s adoption of the rhetoric of equal opportunity
law since the successful challenge of segregation in courts has masked this reality and
made it more difficult for depressed minorities to explain their condition. The injustice is
not produced by an identifiable discriminator anymore, but by the interplay between
historical subordination and a vague suspicion that equality has been achieved when
formal barriers were removed. The following section summarizes the court decisions that
had the greatest influence on education law and policy following Brown in an effort to
show how the potential for change was both created and limited by engaging the rights
discourse. The discussion in the next part is intended as a framework for the main
argument of the paper that the emphasis on formalism and colorblindness since Brown
has rendered the achievement of formal equality an end in itself. This makes it very
difficult to redress the lasting material disadvantage that resulted from a history of racial
subordination because the dominant theory of equal protection does not capture the
complexity of structural segregation. The failure of equal opportunity rhetoric to remedy
current inequities between whites and racial minorities is evidenced by the fact that, as
will be shown, litigants have abandoned equality as a standard for challenging the
substandard education received by minority children.
III. The Shift From Equality to Adequacy
A. The Retreat from Brown: Rodriguez
Nineteen years after Brown, the ideological shift in the Supreme Court at the time of the
Nixon appointments resulted in the Court’s first open refusal to recognize that a right to
39

Ruth Gordon, Foreword, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45
VILL. L. REV. 827, 838 – 839 (2000).
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education is protected by the U.S. Constitution in its ruling in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez 40. Rodriguez, one of the earliest school finance cases, was an
unsuccessful class action challenge to local school finance brought by Mexican American
parents of elementary and secondary school children in the Edgewood Independent
School District on behalf of school children residing in Texas. 41 The main contention in
this case was that the public education funding scheme in Texas resulted in the allocation
of lesser funds per student in poorer districts compared to wealthier ones which amounted
to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The funding
system challenged by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez can be explained as follows. In addition
to the state education funds provided to all school districts, the State of Texas permitted
localities to generate revenues for education finance through a system of property tax
within each district. Given that some districts were property-rich while others were
property-poor, this system inevitably resulted in significant inter-district disparities in
available education funds. 42
The Court’s decision in Rodriguez has been perceived as a retreat from Brown’s
commitment to equal educational opportunity. The Court acknowledged that the
overwhelming majority of school children in Edgewood belonged to minority groups in
contrast with Alamo Heights, the wealthy district, which was predominantly white. 43 The
Court, however, chose to ignore the significance of the districts’ racial make-up, and
considered whether the Texas funding scheme discriminated on the basis of wealth in the
provision of education. In this respect, the Court found that wealth was not a suspect
classification arguing that there was no clearly defined disadvantaged class in Rodriguez
that the financing system can be said to discriminate against. Thus, writing for the Court,
Justice Powell concluded that “the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar
disadvantage of any suspect class.” 44 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell pointed
out that the plaintiffs did not claim a complete deprivation of education, but that they
were receiving a relatively poor quality of education compared to that available to
40

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
Wu, supra note 29, at 142.
42
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U. L. REV. 919, 922 (2001).
43
Id.
44
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
41

11

children in wealthier districts. 45 In the Court’s opinion, however, “where wealth is
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely
equal advantages.” 46
The Court then proceeded to consider whether education is a fundamental right
under the Constitution. After recalling Brown’s emphasis on the importance of education,
Justice Powell noted that “the importance of a service performed by the State,” however,
“does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of
examination under the Equal Protection Clause.” 47 Because courts are not in position to
“create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws,” the key to determining whether education is a fundamental right is to assess
whether a right to education is established either explicitly or implicitly in the
Constitution. 48 Clearly, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly recognize that education
is a fundamental right. Alternatively, the appellees in Rodriguez argued that there is a
nexus between education, on the one hand, and free speech and the right to vote on the
other, and that without proper education citizens cannot fully participate in the political
process. 49 The Court rejected the nexus theory advanced by the appellees and argued that
“[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an
education that falls short.” 50
Rodriguez signaled a turning point in American jurisprudence on education
towards an increasingly limited role of the judiciary in recognizing a right to education
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the finding
that wealth is not a suspect class and that education does not qualify as a fundamental
right, the Rodriguez Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny and following
precedent decided to apply the rational basis test to the claim at hand. In doing so, the
Court held that the state’s reliance on property tax to finance education was rationally
45
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related to the legitimate interest of the state to preserve local control of public schools. 51
As opposed to strict scrutiny, which imposes a substantial burden on the executive to
justify the regulation on the basis of a compelling government interest, the rational basis
review is a lenient standard that only requires a legitimate interest and the existence of a
rational relation between the means and the end. Thus, as one commentator argues,
“[g]enerally, if a regulation of a right is subject to rational basis scrutiny, in all likelihood
the regulation will survive.” 52 In the Rodriguez case, unequal public funding schemes
based on property tax survived in the name of “local control,” the very mechanism that
allowed segregation to flourish in the pre-Brown era and that continues to do so until the
present day.
B. From Equality to Adequacy: The State Courts’ Response
In fact, the holding of the Court in Rodriguez foreclosed any opportunity for litigants to
challenge discriminatory education finance schemes in the federal court system. Hence, in
the decades following Rodriguez education reform litigation shifted to state courts. As a
direct response to Rodriguez, individual states introduced explicit constitutional
protections of the right to education in an attempt to remedy the problems facing the
public education system in the United States.53 In essence, litigants challenged local
funding systems on the basis of either the equal protection clause or the education clause
in state constitutions. 54 Plaintiffs bringing cases under equal protection clauses were,
however, confronted with challenges similar to those in federal equal protection cases. 55
While finance inequality claims based on racial discrimination were usually found by the
courts to be unconstitutional, the courts were reluctant to find constitutional violations if
the government was able to offer a rational justification for the regulation in question. 56
The justification generally offered by the government was again local control. 57 Claims
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brought under the education clause in state constitutions were, however, more successful.
In such cases, plaintiffs did not challenge the equality of the local school finance system
in the conventional sense, but focused instead on the language of the education clause
itself to assess whether there is sufficient funding for schools in poor urban areas to
achieve state educational standards. 58
Thus, it can be said that the litigation strategy in state finance distribution cases
has shifted from challenging the equality of the distribution formula to questioning the
adequacy of the formula in an effort to demonstrate that an education finance system
based on property tax fails to meet the minimum level of education as required by the
education clause in the state’s constitution. Litigants have also argued that the inadequacy
of the distribution system is evidenced by sub-standard student outcomes in poor urban
schools. 59 The link between inadequate school facilities and low student achievement was
made by plaintiffs in one of the recent adequacy lawsuits on the state level. In Campaign
for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 60the plaintiffs maintained that:
If you ask the children to attend school in conditions where plaster is crumbling,
the roof is leaking and classes are being held in unlikely places because of
overcrowded conditions, that says something to the child about how you diminish
the value of the activity and of the child’s participation in it and perhaps of the
child himself. If, on the other hand, you send a child to a school in well-appointed
or [adequate facilities] that sends the opposite message. That says this counts. You
count. Do well. 61
In this case, the New York Supreme Court held that the local education finance scheme
violated the constitution on the basis that the funding of New York City schools was
inadequate. The case originated in a successful claim brought in 1995 by the Campaign
for Fiscal Equity asserting that students in New York City schools were being denied a
“sound basic education” as mandated by the state constitution. The New York Supreme
Court decision was overturned by the appellate court on the basis that the state’s
obligation was limited to certain grade level proficiencies. 62 The litigation ended in 2006
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when the highest court in the State of New York, the State Court of Appeals, issued its
ruling in which it upheld the judgment of the trial court and directed the state to determine
the cost of a “sound basic education” in New York City schools. 63
An overview of state court decisions in cases where the constitutionality of
education funding schemes relying on local property taxes was being challenged by
litigants on the basis of inequality or inadequacy is beyond the scope and purpose of this
paper. A few remarks on the outcome of these cases and its implications for future
education reform litigation are, however, in order here. First, convincing the courts to
recognize that wealth is a suspect class is an extraordinarily difficult task. 64 Courts
recognized early on that establishing wealth as a suspect class would have a spillover
effect on all other governmental services that could be subject to the same claim with
great implications for society at large. 65 Furthermore, the recognition of education as a
fundamental constitutional right by state courts is a remote possibility due to the existence
of contravening federal precedent.66 It is thus plausible to conclude that the success of
challenges

to

local

education

finance

systems

largely

depends

on

the

adequacy/soundness/minimum level language of the education clauses in state
constitutions. The reason for this is that courts have generally moved away from striking
down unequal education finance mechanisms where plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that
inequality produces inadequate education systems that are unable to train students to
reach the state-set standards of education.
C. Adequacy and Equality Arguments
There are many possible explanations for the shift from equality to adequacy arguments
in school finance litigation. While the shift in focus from equality to adequacy is in some
cases arguably a matter of strategy, it seems to be motivated by a feeling of necessity in
other cases where litigants return to court after having lost an equality argument. 67The
shift to adequacy has been generally embraced by the academic community. Professor
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Peter Enrich, for example, has called for “leaving equality behind” 68 because adequacy
may simply prove to be more attainable than equality in school finance reform largely due
to the inherent difficulties in the concept of equity. Arguably, litigants have shifted their
attention from equality to adequacy because equality has proven to be a disappointing
tool in the struggle over education reform. 69 Enrich notes that equality arguments suffer
from several weaknesses. The most important, perhaps, is the difficult task of giving the
concept of equality specific content in the context of education because of the difficulty in
establishing the link between cause and effect. The problem, in other words, is
establishing that inequalities in the education received by white and minority children
result from the disparities in the funding available to schools as a result of local wealth.
According to Enrich, “[t]he connection between the two is now mediated, not
only by political decisions about how heavily to tax, but also by administrative judgments
(and skill) in using the resources that are made available.” 70 Equal educational services
will not guarantee equal schooling because students show up at school with different
needs that have to be addressed in order to realize the ideal of equal educational
opportunity. In fact, many studies growing out of the 1966 Coleman Report 71 suggested
that, by and large, academic achievement levels do not correspond to spending levels and
the educational resources available at schools. 72 Enrich concludes that equality has
proven too ambitious a standard in the context of education reform. 73 The growing
disenchantment with the goal of equality in education, the argument goes, could only
mean that the time has come for education reformers to leave equality behind and pursue
the more modest, but more attainable, goals of adequacy. 74
Enrich is correct in saying that unequal education cannot be solely attributable to
disparities in the funding available to schools. The system of locally funded education is
but one item on the list of factors that contribute to the problem of unequal schooling like
de facto segregation in housing, zoning, economic exclusion and a long history of racial
68
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subordination. It is only natural that equal protection challenges do not yield the desired
results because the factors that combine to produce unequal education are diluted by the
emphasis on race-neutrality that is at the core of a formal understanding of equality. What
Enrich fails to note is that the connection between unequal funding and substandard
education is mediated by all of these factors and not only by taxing policies and
administrative decisions about how to use the available resources. Enrich is right that
equality has disappointed, but he errs in suggesting that adequacy should be pursued
instead of equality as the goal for education reform because adequacy and equality are
conceptually distinct and one cannot simply be substituted for the other. The fundamental
difference between equality and adequacy is the comparative nature of equality. In other
words, the equality approach to educational opportunity is concerned with relative
deprivation, while the adequacy framework aims at the elimination of absolute
deprivation. In practical terms, this means that the adequacy framework makes targeting
additional resources to disadvantaged students above a certain threshold seem less
justifiable.
William Koski and Rob Reich argue that the inequalities that exist above a
threshold level of adequacy are objectionable because education is in large part a
“positional good.” This simply means that “one’s position or relative standing in the
distribution of education, rather than one’s absolute attainment of education, matters a
great deal.” 75 Education is a positional good because it is a decisive factor in the
competition for admission to higher education and for well-paying positions in the job
market. 76 The admissions benefit reinforces the benefit of obtaining a high-paying job,
and both together lead to greater job satisfaction, more civic engagement and better
access to healthcare services on the long-run. 77Koski and Reich argue that insofar as
education is a positional good, adequacy threatens to compound the positional advantage
of the wealthy. 78 Furthermore, adequacy fails to address the needs of the worse-off
because only equality can account for unfair positional advantages in education. 79 For
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these reasons, “adequacy is an inadequate substitute for equality in education policy.” 80
Or as Justice Marshall put it in the context of Rodriguez, it is “of little benefit to an
individual from a property-poor district to have ‘enough’ education if those around him
have more than ‘enough’.” 81
It thus seems hardly possible to trade equality for adequacy if education reform is
to have any meaning at all. All the same, it would be undoubtedly a wrong strategic move
to argue that the substandard education received by children in poor and predominantly
minority children violates the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee. It is
generally not possible to attribute the transition from equality to adequacy in education
reform jurisprudence to changes in the nature of the public education problem itself. The
main features of the problem, with the exception of government sanctioned segregation,
remain largely unaltered. What changed are rather the strategies and counter-strategies
deployed by courts and litigants in trying to deal with the problem. Whereas the aim of
desegregation cases was to achieve equality through integration, school finance cases
focused on the disparities in the availability of resources for education. 82 Both sets of
cases thus shared the initial goal of tying the fate of poor and minority students with that
of their white and wealthy peers. 83But as in desegregation cases, litigants in school
finance cases shifted their attention to securing sufficient funds for a basic (read:
adequate) level of education in the most economically and/or racially isolated school
districts after the Supreme Court declared in Rodriguez that funding inequalities between
school districts does not violate the U.S. Constitution.
Legal scholarship on education policy in the United States mostly oscillates
between support for equal educational opportunity, adequacy arguments and efforts to
combine both. But the fact remains that in education, adequacy is the new equality. Ever
since Rodriguez, educational reform litigation has moved to state courts that provided an
alternative forum for securing equal educational opportunity and adequacy. While
educational equality litigation has continued on the state level, however, cases
challenging the inadequacy of education have been more successful for education reform
80
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movements. But why has equality failed poor and minority schoolchildren, and why has it
disappointed their advocates? Was it not the case for equality that gave us Brown after
all?
The problem, it seems, lies not in the choice of equal protection as a tool for
challenging inequities in the education system because education reform is not about
adequacy at all. As Koski and Reich correctly argue, education is a positional good which
makes inequalities above a certain threshold objectionable. The trouble, as will be shown
in the following part, is with the formalistic approach to equality that dominates the
jurisprudence on education. It will be argued that while society’s adoption of equal
opportunity rhetoric does not in and of itself entail a commitment to racial inequality, the
belief in colorblindness created the unfounded conviction that a break with the past has
been achieved with regards to segregation. As a result of the long history of racial
subordination in the United States, minorities, primarily blacks, suffer from lasting
material disadvantages. Yet, affirmative action programs that aim at remedying the
effects of past discrimination are almost always invalidated by courts under the pretext
that they send out a message of inferiority about minorities because race-neutrality is the
rule. The reason for these paradoxical results, as will be discussed next, is that dominant
theories about equal protection are based on an “anti-differentiation” principle that
perpetuates racial hierarchy by prioritizing race-neutrality over the need to redress a
history of subordination. Ultimately, the aim is to show that in education the process of
social change through the courts has failed because while anti-subordination may be the
aspiration, anti-differentiation is the reality that stands in the way towards a more equal
future.
IV. The Equal Rights Discourse
Blacks made a serious ideological challenge to the dominant system at the time when they
demanded their “rights”: rights taken for granted by Americans, but routinely denied to
blacks. Marvin Jones inquires into the meaning of segregation and concludes that
segregation can be best described as a system of racial caste.84 The harm of segregation,
the argument goes, is social stigma which is significant because it sends a message of
84
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inferiority about blacks: “[s]egregation was rooted in slavery and slavery could only be
rationalized […] by a story of black inferiority. Black inferiority in turn is simply the flip
side of white supremacy. The message of segregation was a message of white supremacy,
i.e. that blacks were an inferior order of human life.” 85 The use of the rights rhetoric can
thus be seen as a radical act and real, tangible changes have accompanied its advent. The
government responded to the demands of the civil rights movement by removing most
formal barriers that represented the subordination of blacks in society. These changes
would not have materialized had the civil rights movement not engaged the rights
discourse because the demands for change would not have reflected the dominant
institutional logic at the time.
Yet while the adoption of equal opportunity rhetoric created the potential for
change, it also defined its limits. As demonstrated previously, the problem of public
education in the United States has evolved into a problem of structural segregation since
Brown was decided. Legalized discrimination in education on ethnic and racial grounds
was successfully challenged in the 1950s, but economic exclusion was never addressed
and federal actors have been increasingly reluctant to recognize the nexus between race
and poverty in devising education reform policies. The historical legacy of racism and
segregation that took its most pervasive form in the housing and education sectors
coupled with the tradition of local school finance produced a system of social institutions
that breeds durable, cumulative, racial inequalities. The disadvantageous situation that
poor and predominantly minority schoolchildren find themselves in as a result today can
only be corrected if fundamental institutional changes were introduced. Unfortunately, the
recognition of the need for deeper institutional changes by civil rights advocates came at a
time when the public has begun to be convinced that the formal changes have
successfully ended the subordination of blacks. 86The same conviction has found its way
into the equal protection doctrine. With its emphasis on colorblindness and raceneutrality, equal opportunity law as developed by the courts in the aftermath of Brown
has been unable to redress racial subordination because it cannot recognize it.

85

Id. at 24.
Kimberli Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1348(1987-1988).
86

20

A. America’s Break with the Past
A good starting point for understanding why the problem of segregation in education has
persisted despite efforts to reverse the course of discrimination against blacks is to ask:
when can it be said that segregation has ended? The question put differently would be:
what constitutes a break with the past in regard to issues of racial discrimination in
America considering the fact that schools have virtually re-segregated since Brown? As a
response to these queries, Marvin Jones suggests that while Brown formally resolved the
segregation dilemma, it failed to define segregation. Specifically, the Court in Brown was
caught between two possible approaches to defining segregation: “was it an evil of
discrete decisions or an evil of its stigmatizing effects?” 87 By failing to address these
questions, the Court left Brown unclear and the dilemma of segregation unresolved which
led to the reproduction and resurfacing of this dilemma in the cases that followed because
the courts never got beyond the text of Brown.
The doctrinal debate in Parents Involved v. Seattle 88 is a good example of the
duality of equality that developed in the aftermath of Brown due to the latter’s failure to
resolve the question of segregation. In this case, the Supreme Court consolidated two
cases that raised the same issue, one from Seattle, Washington and one from Jefferson
County, Kentucky. 89 The question before the Court in Seattle was whether a school
district, that has never operated legally segregated schools, could classify schoolchildren
on the basis of race and then use this classification to allocate slots in high schools as a
measure to achieve racial balance in the schools. In the Seattle case, the school board
responded to a lawsuit brought by the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) in 1969 claiming that the board established and maintained a
system of segregated public schools by a plan that included race-based transfers and
mandatory busing. In 1977, the NAACP filed another legal complaint against the school
board with the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) in the aftermath of which a settlement agreement was signed between the
school board and the OCR to implement what came to be known as the “Seattle Plan.”
The Plan which began with mandatory busing in 1978 evolved by 1999 into an “open
87

Jones, supra note 8, at 4 – 5.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Seattle), 551 U. S. (2007).
89
Jones, supra note 8, at 5.
88

21

choice” plan in which students rank their preferred schools. The district retained a racial
“tiebreaker” for oversubscribed schools to achieve a desired racial balance in each school
when a student’s first choice cannot be accommodated. The petitioner in Seattle, Parents
Involved in Community Schools, challenged the most recent plan, specifically the use of
racial tiebreakers, under the State and Federal Constitutions. The Washington Supreme
Court, the Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the challenge and ruled in favor of the Seattle School District.
In Jefferson County, the school had been under a court-ordered desegregation
scheme beginning in 1975. The complex desegregation plan ordered by the District Court
required redrawing school attendance zones, closing a number of schools and busing
groups of students to schools outside their neighborhood. A decade later the school board
revised its desegregation plan due to changing demographics in the community. It created
new racial percentages, redrew district boundaries, added magnet programs at a few
schools and adjusted the system for grouping and busing students. By 1991, the school
board revisited the desegregation plan once more and came to the conclusion that
assigning elementary school students to more than one school during their elementary
years was unsound educational policy. To avoid the drawbacks of mandatory busing, the
school board adopted a new plan emphasizing school choice. The choice plan that was
modified again in 1996 expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and
middle school students. Under this plan, students were assigned to the school they listed
as their first choice, unless the school was oversubscribed or unless the assignment would
tip the racial balance of the school. In 2000, the District Court dismantled the 1975
desegregation plan after reviewing the present plan. In 2003, the petitioner, Crystal
Meredith, brought a lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of the 1996 plan, but the
challenge was rejected by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit which held the plan constitutional.
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court in Seattle consolidated the two cases
just discussed, as both involve the same issue: can a school district classify on the basis of
race and take race-based measures to achieve racial balance in schools without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee? To answer this question, the
Court in Seattle examined the measures taken under strict scrutiny to determine whether
22

they were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. In applying the
test, the majority held that while remedying past discrimination is a compelling
government interest justifying the use of race-based classifications, such an interest
cannot be said to exist here because the schools involved were never legally segregated
nor subject to court-ordered desegregation. 90 The Court argued that race is an inherently
suspect classification and rejected race-based classifications because they reinforce
notions of racial inferiority and eventually lead to racial hostility. 91 To support its view
that the harm of segregation is the act of dividing people by race itself, the majority
quotes Brown as saying that segregation deprived black schoolchildren of equal
educational opportunity because the classification and separation themselves denoted
inferiority, regardless of whether other factors were equal. 92 In other words, it was not the
inequality of the school facilities but the fact of legally separating children on account of
their race that the Brown court held unconstitutional. 93 Essentially then, Brown was about
the differential treatment accorded to children on the basis of their race or color and its
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is curious how Judge Roberts, speaking for the majority, talks about “American
children” or “schoolchildren” as the group addressed and affected by the judgment in
Brown. In astonishing denial of the unique historic experience of blacks with segregation
and racial domination, Judge Roberts writes: “[b]efore Brown, schoolchildren were told
where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.” 94 To this,
Judge Stevens replies in his dissenting opinion: “[t]he Chief Justice fails to note that it
was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell
stories of white children struggling to attend black schools.” 95 By adding this qualifier,
namely that Brown was about black schoolchildren and not individual schoolchildren, to
the discussion of race-based classifications and their compatibility with equal protection,
the dissent in Seattle views differential treatment from a different standpoint. In contrast
90
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to the majority who condemns any classification by race as inherently suspect, the dissent
argues that any evaluation of differential treatment based on race should focus instead on
whether such treatment imposes a burden on one of the races. The focus, in other words,
should be on exclusion and not separation, on the stigmatizing effects of different
treatment and not the decision to treat differently.
The doctrinal debate between the two sides of the Court thus becomes a
discussion about competing conceptions of equality. In this debate, the majority and
dissent talk past each other. The majority sees discrimination against blacks in
particularistic terms and traces it back to discrete acts or decisions that violate the
principle of colorblindness. Articulating the problem of segregation this way defines the
solution narrowly. According to the majority, the remedy is to extend formal equality to
all Americans and adopt strictly colorblind policies in regulating education. The solution,
in other words, is for society to embrace the equal opportunity ideal, an objective which
has been achieved by Brown. A completely different account of segregation is given by
the dissent in Seattle. For the dissent, the lasting effect of different treatment is what gives
any definition of discrimination its content. Judge Stevens’ observation that Brown is
about black schoolchildren and not individual children is meant to bring into the
discussion about remedial measures of segregation the history of the hierarchical
relationship between blacks and whites. It is meant to highlight the fact that segregation is
a social etiquette based on exclusion that has long historical roots and that cannot possibly
be traced to a set of discrete decisions. Shunning the universalism of the Court, the
dissent contextualizes Brown and the experience of blacks as a powerless minority
suffering from the stigma of a system of segregation imposed by the dominant racial
group. The remedy for this social injury cannot be colorblindness because blacks as a
group have been historically subjected to different treatment and because the effects of
this treatment continued into the present.
Because constitutional interpretation is historical interpretation 96 and because the
law never dictates which meaning attaches to it, the Court in Seattle is not divided by
different legal interpretations, but rather by two different visions of society. What the
majority and the dissent disagree about is what constitutes America’s “break” with the
96
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past when it comes to segregation. For the majority, segregation ended when formal
equality was extended to all Americans regardless of color. Creating a break with the past
seems to be the logic behind the majority’s claim that discrimination cannot account for
current inequities between whites and blacks because the situation of the ‘actual’ victims
of discrimination has been remedied when formal inequality was repealed. The position
of the dissent, on the other hand, is that colorblindness does not make sense at all in a
society where the effects of past discrimination against an identifiable group of people
have continued into the present. What the dissent in Seattle is trying to argue, in other
words, is that society’s adoption of equality rhetoric does not mean the end of racial
inequality and that, far from being the break with the past, the significance of Brown is
that it holds a promise yet to be fulfilled.
B. The Antinomies of Equal Protection
In the aftermath of Brown, courts have focused on the strong proclamation of the Brown
Court that “separate is inherently unequal” and overlooked the fact that the main concern
of the Court was how to redress the subordination of racial minorities. Ever since Plessy,
the formal denial of equality to blacks has been a powerful tool in perpetuating the racial
hierarchy and the exclusion of blacks from the vision of America as a community of
equals. Demanding an end to different treatment and the removal of formal barriers was
useful in the early race discrimination cases to challenge the subordination of blacks that
was primarily manifest in segregation and other discriminatory practices that excluded
blacks. One has to think of the “Whites Only” signs spread throughout American cities
alone to recognize that much of what characterized discrimination against blacks under
segregation was symbolic. 97 Removal of the symbolic manifestations of subordination
that accompanied formal reforms was a significant gain to all blacks, as it renegotiated
their position in the American political vision. Still, some benefited from these reforms
more than others. As Kimberli Crenshaw has pointed out, “[t]he eradication of formal
97
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barriers meant more to those whose oppression was primarily symbolic than to those who
suffered lasting material disadvantage.” 98 The disappearance of “White Only” signs and
other visual indicators of the subordination of blacks reflected society’s acceptance of
equal opportunity rhetoric, but it did not signalize the end of racial inequality. In fact, no
talk of a “break with the past” would make sense until the racial nature of class ideology
is revealed and something is done about the structural problems that account for current
inequities between whites and blacks. 99
Dominant theories of equal protection, however, see to it that achieving a break
with the discriminatory past remains an aspiration at best. As the discussion of Seattle
demonstrates, there are two conflicting principles embedded in the notion of equality:
anti-differentiation and anti-subordination 100. From an anti-differentiation perspective, it
is inappropriate to subject similarly situated individuals to different treatment on account
of their race or color. For proponents of anti-differentiation, colorblindness is the rule in
developing and analyzing legislative and institutional policies. 101 Under the antisubordination perspective, by contrast, it is inappropriate for members of a racial group to
be relegated to a subordinate status in society due to their lack of power vis-à-vis the
dominant racial group.102 The crucial point here is that race-based reform measures that
take the form of affirmative action are invalid under the anti-differentiation approach
because they perpetuate racial stereotypes. Thus, the majority in Seattle argues that a
school district’s decision to divide children by race is unlawful “because such
classifications promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility,” 103 even if the function of these classifications is to achieve integration in de
facto segregated schools. An anti-subordination analysis of the reform policies adopted by
the defendant school districts in Seattle would produce very different results because
under the anti-subordination doctrine facially differentiating – as well as facially neutral –
policies are invalid only if they perpetuate racial hierarchy. 104
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In an insightful article that compares equal protection analysis in race and gender
cases, Ruth Colker criticizes the dominant anti-differentiation approach to equality and
argues that equal protection cases should be analyzed from an anti-subordination
perspective because it is consistent with the history of the equal protection clause and
because it reflects an aspiration that will help society move towards equality. The main
premise of her argument is that society has never set out to ban all distinctions. For
example, distinctions based on intelligence or ability are not regarded as invidious, so
Colker. Thus, distinctions are only prohibited when there is a good reason to believe that
they are offensive or irrational, and it is group-based experiences that give content to this
reasoning. 105 The anti-subordination principle gives voice to a depressed minority’s own
vision of equality and its views about why certain distinctions are invidious because it
recognizes and draws on the particular historical experience of these groups. Antidifferentiation, on the other hand, does a disservice to the history of subordination and to
the understanding of the law as a remedy to this history. 106
In the early equal protection cases, the principle of anti-differentiation has, no
doubt, been a powerful statement against segregation and other exclusionary practices
because different treatment played a central role in perpetuating subordination. 107 But
while the condition of black Americans has significantly changed ever since, no
development in the case law reflecting these changes followed. Courts apply the strict
scrutiny test in cases where issues of race are involved in order to ensure that no law or
policy harboring an invidious purpose passes constitutional muster. The irony is,
however, that taking race seriously has come with a very high price for the black
American community on the long run. The almost complete lack of tolerance towards
race-specific policies under strict scrutiny has led to the awkward result that virtually no
affirmative action programs pass muster because the anti-differentiation principle that
presently informs the courts’ interpretation of the equal protection doctrine assumes that
differentiation can only contribute to subordination and can never redress it. 108 As Ruth
Colker points out, rejecting the elimination of subordination as justification for
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differentiating on the basis of race has “needlessly curtailed the means available to
overcome a history of racial subordination.” 109 She suggests therefore that courts analyze
equal protection cases from an anti-subordination – not an anti-differentiation –
perspective and to invalidate differentiating policies only if they perpetuate racial
subordination. 110 Courts must also ask whether facially neutral policies have a disparate
impact on racial minorities and invalidate such policies if they contribute to subordination
in order to prevent rule-makers from hiding an invidious purpose behind facial
neutrality. 111 This approach, the argument goes, is more faithful to the history of black
subordination and entails a commitment to end racial inequality because it allows the
strict scrutiny level in race cases to be preserved while recognizing that the only
justification for facially differentiating policies is to overcome subordination. 112
V. Conclusion
Anti-subordination may be the aspiration, yet anti-differentiation is the reality. “Whites
Only” signs have been taken down: society embraced racial equality and courts
denounced segregation. Success! But on who’s terms? It was subordination that prompted
the Supreme Court in Brown to respond with the strict ruling that separate is unequal, but
the anti-differentiation principle that has been read into Brown’s equal protection analysis
obscures the historical experience of minorities. The strict level of scrutiny in race cases
has ruled out much needed remedial policies to overcome a history of racial
subordination. As the most rigorous form of judicial review, strict scrutiny is supposed to
afford racial equality the greatest protection available under the constitution. Oddly,
beyond the invalidation of different treatment laws that perpetuated subordination under
segregation, strict scrutiny reverses the course of equality because present equality
protection analysis is infused with an anti-differentiation understanding of the law that
concerns itself neither with lasting disadvantage nor with the means to redress it.
The rulings in Seattle and other similar cases that condemned race-based
classifications in affirmative action programs as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
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demonstrate that equal protection analysis has evolved into a Frankenstein creature of
sorts that is blocking the way towards equality. Well-meaning academics like Ruth
Colker suggest that adopting an anti-subordination perspective on equality will help the
American society to move forward on racial equality. They may be right. But, once again,
anti-differentiation, formality and colorblindness are the rules of the game. As a civil
rights visionary has observed, “a ‘color-blind’ society built upon the subordination of
persons of one color [is] a society which cannot correct that subordination because it
[can] never recognize it.” 113 The tendency now is to regard inequities between blacks and
whites as a fair measure of merit. As mentioned before, creating a break with the history
of subordination provides the basis for the claim that current inequities cannot be the
fruits of a discriminatory past because society no longer discriminates against blacks. The
stigma of inferiority that resulted from the unique historical experience of blacks and the
fact that blacks are worse off than whites reinforces the popular belief that the market is
fair and impartial. 114 After all, non-differentiation is the rule and the market rewards the
superior.115 But all of these arguments are simply rationalizations for the failure to redress
the lasting effects of subordination.
In retrospect, it is not difficult to see how Brown has failed as a framework for
social change through the courts. This is not surprising because laws and courts play a
major role in institutionalizing socio-economic power arrangements. Channeling complex
issues to the legal arena silences the fundamental questions behind these issues and
results in discussions that are apparently technical, neutral and devoid of politics. Racebased classifications that are used to redress historical subordination are subjected to
“strict scrutiny” and almost never upheld as “necessary means” to achieving the
“compelling government interest” of remedying the effects of past discrimination. Never
mind that these measures are “necessary” for improving the future of racial minorities;
the formula works. As some commentators have observed, Brown was not the change but
merely a catalyst for the change that followed; it was “a spark to a revolution culminating
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in civil rights acts and erstwhile affirmative action programs.” 116Brown’s was not a
legacy of education made available to all on equal terms. This was a promise that remains
unfulfilled. What racial minorities and their advocates need is a post-Brown strategy
grounded in the reality of economic exclusion and perpetual, cumulative inequality above
all the formalism and neutrality of the courts. Whatever this post-Brown strategy, it must
not look at the legal arena as the only venue for change and rights discourse as the sole
emancipatory possibility. If racial minorities in America are to succeed, they must
succeed on their own terms and not the terms of a (color)blind legal community that is
delusional about its own history.
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